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This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. 
Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral 
investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a 
multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such 
a regime increases worldwide FDI and raises the world interest rate. Distinguishing three 
groups of countries, we show that industrialized countries experience an outflow of capital but 
benefit overall due to an increase in repatriated profits. Middle income countries are likely to 
gain from increased inward FDI, whereas least developed countries lose because they receive 
less FDI. Our results explain the stylized fact that a multilateral investment agreement was 
opposed by least developed nations and certain groups in rich countries. 
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alone. 1 Introduction
A multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) is an agreement between sovereign states which is meant
to safeguard the investments that companies undertake in foreign countries. Given the ubiquitousness of
foreign direct investment, one would expect to ﬁnd such an agreement at the top of every international
organization’s agenda. In fact, this was the case only a few years ago. The OECD started negotiations in
1995 and the newly established WTO set up a working group in 1996. At the time, however, those attempts
failed. The negotiations at the OECD were suspended in 1998 and the WTO did not move beyond TRIMS,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures that is limited, nomen est omen, to the subset of
trade-related investments.
Judging from the public debate at the time, there were two main reasons responsible for derailing the
project: One is political opposition and the other the lack of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of
bilateral investment treaties. The political opposition has come from two distinct groups: On the one hand,
from the anti-globalization lobby that represents a subset of the population in rich industrialized countries;
on the other, from poor, least-developed countries that were opposed to the agreement even though they were
never obliged to join in. In this paper, we explain these stylized facts and renew the case for a multilateral
investment agreement.1
The main hurdle for such an agreement to succeed is that it has to be self-enforcing, since no-one can
effectively prevent a sovereign country from expropriating foreign property.2 Unlike in the trade context,
however, the game is not played eye-to-eye between countries, but rather between the FDI-receiving country
and a single foreign company or investor. The key feature of our approach is therefore to envisage the
agreement as a coordination device that allows companies to react jointly should one of them be subject to
renegotiation or outright expropriation in any one country. Note that due to the absence of any agreement in
practice, the mechanism we envisage and analyze is merely one possible form.
The model we propose features a continuum of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that can invest in a
continuum of different countries. At the same time that a company decides on its investment in a particular
country, it negotiates the rate at which its revenue will be taxed in that country. To capture the general
1The lack of progress towards establishing a MAI clearly does not imply that such an agreement would not be beneﬁcial. As
for the empirical evidence, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) provides one of the rare studies and concludes that there is little evidence
that bilateral investment treaties have stimulated additional investment. In contrast, more recent empirical work on bilateral treaties
by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) does ﬁnd a positive effect of implementing bilateral investment treaties on the stock of FDI. And
recent policy measures in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela that have moved to expropriate foreign oil companies emphasize
the potential beneﬁts from closer cooperation in this important area of global economic integration.
2Even US military might failed to do so in the case of Cuba.
1equilibrium effects of a world capital market, the marginal cost of capital is assumed to be increasing. Once
an investment has been undertaken, the country can potentially renegotiate the tax rate or even expropriate
the investment, in which case it obtains the capital invested but forgoes (its share of) future proﬁts as a
result of retaliation. Without a multilateral investment agreement, this retaliation takes the form of a perpet-
ual investment-stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, on the other hand, expropriation
triggers a joint investment-stop by all MNEs vis-` a-vis that particular country.
We show that switching to a MAI regime increases worldwide FDI and consequently raises the interest
rate. Industrialized countries lose inward FDI due to the higher interest rate, and because the expropriation
risk is zero to begin with and cannot be reduced any further. However, taking into account its role as home
countries, the industrialized world beneﬁts over-all as it now receives more repatriated proﬁts from the
MNEs that are predominantly based there. Middle income countries stand to be the main beneﬁciaries from
increased FDI because the agreement reduces the risk of expropriation in these countries and thereby makes
investments there more attractive. Least developed countries, on the other hand, that had very little FDI to
start with do not reduce their expropriation risk by much and therefore tend to suffer a reduction in FDI due
to increased interest rates.
Our results explain the stylized facts of the obstacles that have stalled past proposals for a MAI. Even
though the industrialized countries stand to gain in the aggregate, these gains would be concentrated in the
hands of those that have a stake in MNEs. Other parts of the population would lose through outsourcing
and therefore oppose the agreement. The least-developed countries do not have enough FDI at the outset
to take advantage of the coordination and to constrain themselves from expropriating foreign investments.
They therefore lose due to the increased interest rate and lower FDI, essentially being crowded out by the
middle income countries. In addition, our approach also sheds light on the lack of empirical evidence for the
beneﬁts from bilateral investment agreements. Coordination is clearly more effective the more countries,
and hence companies, participate.
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to rigorously model a MAI as a coordination
device.3 We do draw on prior literature, though. The idea of self-enforcing international trade agreements
has been developed and reﬁned by Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and many of their students. The paper that
is most closely related to ours is Maggi (1999), who uses the concept of ”third party sanctions” going back
to Bendor and Mookherjee (1990) and Kandori (1992) to explain the role of the WTO. Contrary to the trade
3Turrini and Urban (2003) modeled a MAI as an exogenously-assumed uniform, absolute reduction in the share of proﬁts
retained by the host country. Their model does not capture the expropriation risk, nor does it account for the fact that industrialized
countries have high tax rates.
2context where WTO rules do not envisage coordinated punishment, we are free to consider it for a future
MAI and will argue that it would be quite effective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the theoretical model.
Section 3 introduces the multilateral investment agreement. In Section 4, we analyze the effects of changes
in incentive slackness and then use this analysis in Section 5 to derive the effects of joining an existing
MAI. In Section 6, we analyze the effects of instituting a MAI, focusing on speciﬁc cases. Section 7 offers
concluding remarks.
2 Model
In this section we outline the theoretical model. Given that a multilateral investment agreement is meant
to safeguard the investments of companies in foreign countries, our framework revolves around these two
types of players. Let there be a continuum of countries indexed by i ∈ [0,1] that are open to foreign direct
investment. And investments are carried out by a continuum of companies, indexed by j ∈ [0,1], which
we think of as large (multinational) corporations.4 We will use the term multinational enterprise (MNE)
through-out the paper as these ﬁrms turn into multinationals the moment they invest in another country.
Though one might think of them as supra-national or even state-less players, we require that each MNE is
headquartered in a particular country where its repatriated proﬁts accrue. We then consider each country in
terms of two roles: home country and host country. As home country, it receives repatriated proﬁts from
companies that are based there. As host country, it receives (foreign and domestic) companies’ investments.
We assume that each country is home to a unit measure of ﬁrms.5 In reality, of course, some countries might
not play home to any MNE. Our framework allows for this possibility as we can think of a companies from
such a country as having negative proﬁts wherever they invest.
As a host, each country i represents an investment opportunity (not necessarily a proﬁtable one) for
every company j. These investment opportunities are characterized by potential proﬁts of pi,j(Ki,j,K) ≡
Ri,j(Ki,j)−r(K)Ki,j, where the revenue Ri,j(Ki,j) depends on the amount of capital Ki,j invested by company





0 Ki,jdi d j. With respect to the revenue function, we assume that production requires a ﬁxed
4The assumption of continua allows us to focus on the interaction between companies and countries by eliminating any strategic
interaction between players of the same type, such as tax competition, for example.
5The measure of companies in the world is thus [0,1]x[0,1]. For simplicity, we assume that each host country offers only a
continuum of investment opportunities. In other words, companies potentially investing in a host country are randomly drawn from
among the entire set.
3amount of capital before it starts to generate positive output. Furthermore, we take revenue to be net of
costs other than the cost of capital that the MNE invests in the country. In other words, it is operating proﬁt
excluding the cost of the foreign direct investment. Note that having the operating proﬁt depend only on the
own capital stock is a simplifying assumption that excludes negative competition effects as well as positive
spill-overs from other FDI. Let us emphasize that Ki,j can be zero, of course, and typically will be for many
company-country pairs. As for the cost of capital r(K), we assume that it depends positively on the total
amount of investment world-wide in order to capture general equilibrium price effects once the MAI brings
about an increase in investment. For simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates completely at the end of
each period. Investments are thus decided anew, or reviewed, every period.
As for the timing within periods, we envisage the following sequence: First, the prospective investor
and the country negotiate a tax rate while the company simultaneously decides how much to invest. Since
companies are often lured with promises of special tax breaks and other niceties, such as cheap real-estate
or tailor-made infrastructure, we assume that the tax rate ti,j negotiated between country i and company j is
company-speciﬁc. Even though a country’s ofﬁcial tax rate is most likely uniform for all companies, netting
out special deals leaves us with a company-speciﬁc effective tax rate. At the same time that the tax rate is
agreed upon, the company decides whether, and, if it does, how much to invest in a particular country. In
doing so, it counts on the government to stand by its promise and charge the agreed upon rate. However,
once the the investment is in place, the country can renegotiate or even expropriate the investment. This is
the key problem we are concerned with in this paper. We assume for simplicity that as soon as this happens,
the company resorts to a trigger strategy of never investing in that country again. Faced with such a strategy,
the only deviation worth considering from the country’s point of view, is to expropriate the entire investment.
Note that even though we will frame the game in terms of outright expropriation, we take this strategy to
stand for renegotiation more generally.
Solving the problem backwards, ifcountry istands byitspromise, itwillcollect a(previously negotiated)
share ti,j of company j’s proﬁt pi,j(Ki,j,K) from its investment Ki,j in country i every period. Alternatively,
if country i decides to expropriate the investment, then it receives the value of the investment in that period




where di denotes the discount factor of the country which reﬂects its rate of time preference. In other words,
4from the country’s perspective it is worthwhile to refrain from expropriating the foreign direct investment as
long as the discounted present value of the country’s share in the proﬁt stream on the left hand side exceeds
the one-time pay-off from deviation on the right hand side.
Before the country can potentially expropriate, the company and the country have to agree on a tax
rate and the company has to decide how much to invest. We assume that the negotiation takes the form of
Nash-bargaining, subject to the country’s IC-constraint from equation (1) above. That is, the company and








where a indicates the relative bargaining power of the country vis-` a-vis the company. The outcome of this
bargaining process is ti,j = max{a,ˆ ti,j(Ki,j,K)}, where ˆ ti,j(Ki,j,K) is the minimum tax rate that satisﬁes the
country’s IC-constraint which in turn depends on the capital stock the company chooses.
The company’s investment decision thus depends, via the tax rate, on the country’s IC-constraint. Sup-




The tax rate in this case is a and the investment is determined by the familiar zero marginal proﬁt condition.
If the country’s IC-constraint is binding, then company j’s optimization takes the form:
max
Ki,j
(1−ˆ ti,j(Ki,j,K)) pi,j(Ki,j,K) (4)
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is ¶pi,j/¶Ki,j = 1−d which implies that Ki,j is smaller than in the
unconstrained case. The tax rate might be higher than a if it is proﬁtable for the company to accept a higher
tax rate rather than to reduce its investment further in order to satisfy the country’s IC-constraint at a tax rate
of a.6 If the country’s IC-constraint cannot be satisﬁed even at a tax rate of 100 %, then the company, facing
certain expropriation, will not invest. To conclude our exposition of the model, let us quickly point out that
6We will return to this problem and analyze it in greater detail in the next section.
5the company’s participation constraint, namely that proﬁts be non-negative, will never be binding for any
positive investment. This is because a negative proﬁt would a fortiori violate the country’s IC-constraint.
3 Multilateral Agreement
We now consider a multilateral investment agreement which is the focus of attention in this paper. Given
that such an agreement does not yet exist in practice, we propose a type of agreement that we consider
to be plausible. In particular, we think of a MAI as a coordination device for companies. While it is the
countries that sign the agreement, it will be the companies based in those countries and facing renegotiation
or even expropriation in other member countries that can take advantage of the agreement.7 We envisage
that the agreement institutes a reporting mechanism that veriﬁes and diseminates information as soon as
companies face renegotiation or expropriation in a country that has signed up to be part of the MAI. Note
that the FDI-receiving country must have signed up to the agreement because only a participating member
country can be expected to cooperate in the veriﬁcation procedure. Once it is veriﬁed and made public that a
company has been forced to renegotiate or has been expropriated, then this information allows all companies
to coordinate their response vis-` a-vis the offending country. Note that for the time being we do not specify
the set of countries that take part in the agreement. Instead, we simply assume that the MAI comprises
a subset of countries of strictly positive measure. We will return to the question which countries have an
incentive to join below.
Under such a multilateral investment agreement then, whenever a country that is part of the agreement
deviates, this will trigger an investment-stop not just by the company affected but rather by all companies.
Faced with such a coordinated reaction to any single deviation, the country need only consider expropriating









Ki,jd j ∀i ∈ I. (5)
Note that there are no longer separate incentive constraints vis-` a-vis single companies, but only one incentive
constraint per member country that applies to all of its inbound foreign direct investment. Under this regime,
a country will refrain from expropriation as long as its share in the proﬁt stream of all companies invested
(the LHS) exceeds the stock of foreign direct investment (the RHS).
7We assume for simplicity that all MNEs can use the agreement. Most MNEs are based in rich, industrialized countries and as
we will show below these countries have every incentive to join the agreement.
6To compare the country’s incentive constraint under a MAI regime to the constraints it faces without a
MAI, we deﬁne, for each country i, DICi,j satisfying
Z 1
0
DICi,jd j = 0,
which allows us to rewrite condition (5) as
ti,j
1−di
pi,j(Ki,j,K)+DICi,j ≥ Ki,j for all j ∈ [0,1], (6)
We refer to DICi,j as the variation in incentive slackness needed to keep the country’s relation with company
j incentive compatible. Without a MAI country i may have strictly positive incentive slackness with respect
to a company j for an investment of Ki,j (in the sense that
ti,j
1−dipi,j(Ki,j,K)−Ki,j > 0), or negative incentive
slackness if the constraint is violated. Under MAI, a uniﬁed incentive constraint effectively allows the
country to extend spare IC-slackness from some companies to others. As this spare IC-slackness is always
“distributed” from one company to another, the integral of DICi,j over j ∈ [0,1] always equals zero.
4 Variations in Incentive Slackness
Having introduced the crucial concept of variations in IC-slackness in the previous section, we want to
analyze the effects that such variations have on the investment behavior of a MNE in a particular country as
well as on the tax rate. Elucidating these effects in pure form will prove helpful when we return to analyze





Figure 1 depicts the proﬁt of company j in country i as a function of the capital the company invests in
that country. The linear downward sloping part reﬂects the ﬁxed cost needed for positive production, and
the kink indicates where production starts. The various upward sloping lines in the diagram represent the
RHS of equation (4) above for different variations of IC slackness. Consider a country-company pair where
the IC-constraint is so stringent — possibly because the proﬁtability of the investment opportunity is low
— that it cannot be satisﬁed even at a tax rate of a 100 percent. This case is represented by the left-most
7K
pi,j












K : p′ = 1−d
Figure 1: Variations in incentive slackness
incentive constraint in Figure 1. The constraint has a slope of 1−d corresponding to a tax rate of a 100
percent and we see that there is no positive investment that satisﬁes the constraint. The company therefore
chooses not to invest.8
Now suppose the constraint is relaxed because more outside IC-slackness becomes available or — a
slight abuse of the diagram — because the investment is more proﬁtable. Once the constraint touches the
proﬁt curve, the company invests according to its constrained ﬁrst order condition p′ = 1−d at a tax rate
of a 100 percent. If we add more slackness to the system the company will still invest the same amount and
the IC-constraint rotates counter-clockwise through the tangency point as the tax rate goes down, until it is
eventually reduced to a.
Once the tax rate reaches a and we further relax the constraint by adding even more outside IC-
slackness, the company slowly increases its investment. As long as the IC-constraint is binding, however,
the company keeps its investment below the optimum to avoid a higher tax rate. In other words, the company
reduces its investment to keep the tax rate down because it is preferrable to forgo the marginal gain from
more investment rather than to accept a higher proﬁt tax on the entire investment.
Eventually — as more IC-slackness becomes available — the company chooses the optimal uncon-
strained investment characterized by p′ = 0. If the constraint is relaxed beyond this point the investment
does not increase anymore and the tax rate remains at a. This case is represented by the right-most IC-
constraint.
8Note that if the decision not to invest is due to the unproﬁtability of the investment opportunity, i.e. pi,j < 0, then addi-
tional incentive slackness does not change this decision. Additional incentive slackness can only relax the IC-constraint, not the
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Figure 2: Effects on tax rate and investment
9Figure 2 summarizes the discussion above. In this ﬁgure, we consider a country-company pair such
that without a MAI no investment is incentive compatible. Under a MAI regime, as slackness increases we
move from the left-most region where the IC-constraint is unsatisﬁable and no investment takes place to the
middle region where the IC-constraint is (merely) binding. In the left part of this range, the tax rate comes
down from 100 percent to a while the investment is unchanged at its constrained optimum, K, characterized
by p′(K) = 1−d. In the right part of this range, the tax rate is a and the investment increases towards its
unconstrained optimum as slackness becomes available. To the right of the optimum, a further relaxation
does neither affect the tax rate nor the size of the investment which stay unchanged at a and K : p′(K) = 0
respectively.
In the following we assume that the government of country i “allocates” the variations in incentive









DICi,jd j = 0 (8)
To facilitate the rest of our analysis, we imagine that each company has a (potential) investment oppor-
tunity in every host country and we introduce the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 1. For any (host) country i, there exists a mapping ki(j) ∈ [0,1] which indexes company j ∈
[0,1] in such a way that
Rki(j)( ˜ K) ≡ max{0, f( ˜ K)+c(ki(j))} ∀ ˜ K
where f : Â+ → Â is a concave, strictly increasing function with lim ˜ K→0 = −¥, and c : Â → Â is a strictly
increasing function.
Assumption 1 says that, in each host country, companies can be sorted according to the amount of rev-
enue they obtain for a given amount of investment ˜ K, and that, among these companies, the difference in the
level of revenue is independent of ˜ K. Along with this assumption, we deﬁne three‘benchmark companies’
for a host country i at a given capital cost r: k1
i (r) ∈ Â which invests the optimal level K(r) ∈ Â and is at
the borderline of becoming constrained, k2
i (r) ∈ Â, which invests the minimal amount K(r) while paying a
tax rate of a; and k3
i (r) ∈ Re, which just invests K(r) while facing a tax rate of 100%. Figure 3 illustrates
Assumption 1 and highlights these three ‘benchmark companies’. As shown in the diagram, the proﬁt func-
tion shifts upward across companies. Accordingly, it is clear from the diagram that k1
i (r) > k2
i (r) > k3
i (r)











Figure 3: The H correspondence
In contrast to our earlier Figure 1, the diagram does not directly feature any variations in incentive
slackness and therefore describes the situation of country i before joining a MAI. It does so implicitly,
however. Note that changes in the cost of capital shift k1
i (r,k2
i (r), and k3
i (r) on the real line Â. Thus,
depending on the capital cost, kh
i (r),h ∈ {1,2,3} may fall to the left of, into, or to the right of, the [0,1]
interval in which actual companies are indexed. We can in turn determine whether, prior to joining a
MAI, the host country i enjoys some spare variations of slackness with respect to some companies (when
k3
i (r) < 1), and/or has some negative variations of slackness vis-` a-vis some others (when k1
i (r) > 0).
5 Marginal Effect of Joining a MAI
We are now in a position to analyze the effects of forming a multilateral investment agreement. In this
section we derive general results. Given the level of generality of our framework, we will subsequently
illustrate these results by discussing speciﬁc cases in the next section. The driving force behind our results
will be the relaxation of the countries’ incentive constraints, which is brought about by the multilateral
agreement.
The ﬁrst interesting result concerns the total amount of investment each MNE undertakes worldwide.
We are able to show that:
11Proposition 1. Given the cost of capital r(K), the global investment Kj ≡
R 1
0 Ki,jdi of company j ∈ [0,1]
weakly increases under a MAI regime.
Proof. Suppose the global investment of company j did go down. This implies that Ki,j decreases in at least
one country i. Consider the variation of incentive slackness DICij available to company j in country i under
the MAI. This variation in incentive slackness can be i) positive, ii) zero, or iii) negative. Consider the three
cases in turn:
i) If the variation is positive, then the IC-constraint is relaxed and the investment weakly increases as
shown in the last section.
ii) If the variation is zero, then the IC-constraint remains unchanged and Ki,j remains unchanged.
iii) If the variation is negative, then other investors in country i are using up some of company j’s IC-
slackness. This implies that company j has reduced its investment and its after-tax proﬁts are lower
than before. However, it could declare not to make use of the agreement in country i and not to
participate in any third-party punishment, hence face the original IC-constraint which would leave it
with a higher after-tax proﬁt.
Each case generates a contradiction and therefore the global investment of company j must be weakly
increasing, conditional on the cost of capital.
The intuitive reason behind this result is clear: the relaxation of the IC-constraints in all participating
countries leads to more investment. There are several direct implications of Proposition 1. We summarize
them in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. From Proposition 1 it follows that:




0 Ki,jdid j weakly increases under a MAI
regime.
ii) The cost of capital r(K) weakly increases under a MAI regime.
iii) World-wide investment K weakly increases under a MAI regime.
iv) Worldwide surplus weakly increases under a MAI regime.
12Part i) follows from Proposition 1. It implies that the demand function for global capital shifts out. Given
this shift in demand and our assumption that supply is upward-sloping, Part ii) says that the price of capital
increases and Part iii) that the amount invested must increase. The increase in investment in turn implies
that the surplus must go up. This is important as it suggests that establishing a MAI regime is desirable from
the world’s perspective.
The results above do not establish a sufﬁcient condition for a strict increase in capital investment. Such
a condition is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Given the cost of capital r(K), the global investment Kj ≡
R 1
0 Ki,jdi of company j ∈ [0,1]
strictly increases under a MAI regime, if there exists a set of host countries H of positive measure, such that
the following two conditions hold:
i) k3
i (r) < 1 for all i ∈ H, and
ii) k2
i (r) < ki(j) < k3
i (r) for all i ∈ H.
Conditions i) and ii) state that there exists a non-trivial set of host countries, each of which has spare
variations of incentive slackness vis-` a-vis some companies, and where in each the company under consid-
eration will increase its investment if some spare variation of incentive slackness becomes available. The
same sufﬁcient condition can be applied to the corollary above to yield strict increases.
Let us turn to an individual country and examine whether it beneﬁts from joining the MAI, conditional
on other countries’ participation decision in the MAI. We leave to the next section the discussion of the
collective decision of a group of countries whether to form or take part in a MAI. Given the existence of a
MAI, whether an individual country participates in the MAI has no effect on the global cost of investment
(given that there is a continuum of countries). Thus, we can apply Proposition 1 and conclude that a country
always (weakly) beneﬁts from joining the MAI as a home country. The home country is strictly better off
provided that some of its companies strictly beneﬁt from the MAI, i.e. satisfy the conditions of Proposition
2 above.
As a host, a country can beneﬁt from joining an MAI only if there exist companies with ki(j) > k3
i (r),
that is, only if there are companies that did not face a binding incentive constraint before the country joined
the MAI, and which hence can contribute variation in incentive slackness to other companies investing in
that country. Suppose such companies do exist, then a host country strictly beneﬁts from “reallocating”
these variations in line with the maximization per equation (8) to companies with ki(j) ∈ [k2
i (r),k3
i (r)) as
13these companies will subsequently increase their investments in the host country. It can also strictly beneﬁt
from reallocating to companies with ki(j) < k1
i (r) if these companies begin to invest in the host country
after a sufﬁcient amount of variation is allocated to them.
However, when companies with ki(j) ∈ [k1
i (r),k2
i (r)) begin to take advantage of these variations, they
will be able to negotiate a lower tax rate, as illustrated in Figure 3. In this case, the host country’s welfare
may be reduced. Accordingly, a host country i will ﬁrst allocate excess IC slackness to companies with
ki(j) / ∈ [k1
i (r),k2
i (r)). If these companies cannot exhaust the excess in IC slackness, the host country has
no way to prevent companies with ki(j) ∈ [k1
i (r),k2
i (r)) from taking advantage of the remaining variations
and negotiate down the tax rate.
The following proposition establishes a sufﬁcient condition for home and host countries to gain from
unilaterally joining an existing MAI:
Proposition 3. Given the cost of capital r(K), a home country i is always weakly better off joining an
existing MAI and is strictly better off if there exists a set of companies based in country i, ˜ Ji, of positive
measure, such that for all j ∈ ˜ Ji conditions i) and ii) of Proposition 2 above hold.
Furthermore, a host country i is weakly better off joining an exisiting MAI and is strictly better off if
i) ∃J of positive measure, such that for all j ∈ J condition i) of Proposition 2 holds, and
ii) ∃ ˜ J of positive measure such that for all j′ ∈ ˜ J condition ii) of Proposition 2 holds, and
iii) ∀j, api,j(Ki(r)) ≥ pi,j(Ki(r)).
Proof. Wehave argued forthecase ofahome country inthetext. Herewefocus on ahost country. Condition
i) of the proposition ensures that there exist ﬁrms with positive IC slackness. Condition ii) guarantees that
there exist ﬁrms that can use the slackness to invest more. Condition iii) implies that if slackness goes to
ﬁrms that can reduce their tax rate, then they will be moved all the way to the optimal amount and generate
more tax revenue for the host country despite the lower tax rate.
6 Joint MAI Participation Decisions
The previous section focused on a country’s unilateral decision to join a MAI. In this section we turn our
attention to the joint participation decisions of selected groups of countries. While the analysis above, due
14to the assumption that countries are inﬁnitessimal, treated the cost of capital as constant, the impact on the
global cost of capital can no longer be ignored when a positive measure of countries join their decisions.
However, the challenge of analyzing the joint participation decisions is that one can think of many possible
groups, each with different combinations of countries. To focus our discussion, we examine two speciﬁc
cases that illustrate the explanatory power of the general framework developed so far. First, we discuss a
symmetric case which we take to represent the effects of a MAI among OECD countries. Subsequently, we
turn to a three-country-group framework where one group represents rich, industrialized countries, a second
group is made up of middle-income countries, and the third group includes poor developing countries.
Finally, as we consider the change in the global cost of capital for investments, we must also take into
account its implication on the income of capital owners, which in turn depends on the distribution of capital
ownership across countries.9 We will specify this distribution as we analyze the two speciﬁc cases.
Before moving on to speciﬁc cases, we make one observation which states that, if a group of countries
jointly decide not to participate in a MAI, they will also be against the existence of such an international
agreement, provided that, when there does not exist a MAI, each of these countries import capital from
outside the group for the last unit of investment in the country. The reason is as follows. If the countries
choose not to join, the only impact of an existing MAI on their welfare is the rising global cost of capital
as investments expand within MAI member countries. And since the last unit of investment relies on cap-
ital from outside the group, these countries must be made worse-off on the last unit of investment by the
emergence of an MAI.10
Proposition 4. Suppose a group of countries jointly decide not to participate in a MAI and suppose further
that each of them import capital for the last unit of investment from outside the group when there does not
exist a MAI. Then these countries must be worse off as a result of the existence of a MAI.
Turning now to the ﬁrst case of symmetric countries, symmetry in our context involves the following
two aspects: First, for any global cost of capital r, each host country offers the same proﬁle of investment
opportunities and each home country has the same proﬁle of investment opportunities faced by its com-
panies. Second, all investments are ﬁnanced within these countries and for any r, each of these countries
supplies the same amount of capital. Given that all countries are symmetric in this sense, we imagine them
9In a general equilibrium setting, income of factors are likely to be affected by the presence of MAI as well. However, owing to
the partial equilibrium nature of our framework, we will not be able to elaborate on this aspect in details.
10For intra-marginal investments, however, the effect of an MAI is at best neutral to these countries when capital owners of all
the intra-marginal investments are citizens of these countries, in which case the higher investment cost of capital is offset by higher
income of capital owners within these countries.
15as one group, deciding whether or not to establish a MAI among themselves. We know from our analysis in
the previous section that the global surplus increases. By symmetry then, every country must be better off.
Looking closer at the distribution of the surplus, we have the same marginal effects as above and, in addition,
the increase in the cost of capital due to the MAI. For capital owners, the higher cost of capital implies a
higher capital income. For all types of companies, the MAI combines the marginal effects already discussed
with the effect of the higher cost of capital on investments. Note that within the existing investment the latter
is purely redistributive, and hence, since capital ownership is symmetric across countries, cancels out with
the increase in capital income from the individual country’s perspective.
Proposition 5. Suppose all countries are symmetric. Then these countries as a group are (weakly) better
off by establishing a MAI.
The three-country-group case is more complex and at the same time more interesting. We assume
that each country i is a member of one of the following three subsets of countries of equal measure: rich
countries R, middle-income countries M, and poor countries P. Countries within each group are identical.
Only rich countries are home to companies that potentially generate positive proﬁts in other countries. All
three groups of countries host companies that can potentially generate proﬁts there. Moreover, we assume
that for all relevant costs of capital, k3
R(r) < 1 and k3
R(r) < k3
M(r) < k3
P(r), i.e. rich countries have a larger
(and strictly positive) measure of unconstrained companies with excess IC-slackness than middle countries,
which in turn have more unconstrained companies than the representative poor country. Finally, we assume
that all capital owners reside in rich and middle-income countries.
A joint participation decision affects the global cost of capital, which in turn changes the fraction of
companies that invest the optimal amount, the minimal amount, and those with investments in between.
As the cost of capital goes up, it shifts pi,j(Ki,j,r) as illustrated in the following diagram. In Figure 4,




¶Ki,j . This has the following
implication:
Lemma 1. For any country i, k1
i (r) and k2
i (r) are increasing in the cost of capital r, and k3
i (r) is increasing
in the cost of capital r if −R′′(K,r)K > (1−d)/a.
Proof. Toprovethe ﬁrstpart, note that k1
i andk2
i aredeﬁned bypk(K)= 1−d
t K, wheret =1for k1
i andt =a
for k2
i . Differentiation with respect to r, and taking into account that the slope with respect to K evaluated
at K equals (1−d)/t, yields ¶R
¶k
¶k







Figure 4: The cost of capital effect
the RHS are both positive. Regarding the second part, k3
i is deﬁned by pk3(K) = 1−d
a K. Differentiating as
before, and using the fact that the partial derivative with respect to K evaluated at K equals zero, we obtain
the stated result.
Note that despite the fact that for small increases in r the threshold k3
i might decrease when the condition
given above does not hold, this effect disappears for larger, discrete changes of r. Therefore, Lemma 1 im-
plies that, as the global cost of capital increases, in each country, there will be fewer companies contributing
variations in incentive slackness, each contributing company will contribute a smaller amount of variation
in incentive slackness, whereas at the same time there will be more companies in need for such variations in
incentive slackness in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints.
Turning now to our speciﬁc case, we deﬁne Wi(w,r(w)) as the welfare received by a representative
country i ∈ {R,M,P} where w ∈ {R,RM,RP,RMP, / 0} is the possible group conﬁguration for a MAI. w = R
indicates a MAI consisting of all rich countries and rich countries only. w = RM represents a MAI made of
rich and middle-income countries, and so forth. No MAI exists when w = / 0. Note that because only rich
countries play the role of home countries, a MAI is not feasible without the participation of rich countries.
r(w) is the equilibrium cost of capital that depends on the group conﬁguration in a MAI.
The joint decision game among the three country groups is then deﬁned as each group choosing whether
to participate, given its anticipation of other groups’ participation choice. The equilibrium MAI is the
17resulting Nash equilibrium in participation decisions.
We start by establishing that the group of rich countries ﬁnds any MAI beneﬁcial compared to no MAI,
and thus is willing to institute such an agreement even if the other two groups do not participate:
Proposition 6. WR(w = R) ≥WR(/ 0). Furthermore, for any w / ∈ {R, / 0}, WR(w) ≥WR(/ 0) if k3
R(r(w)) ≤ 0.
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality follows a fortiori from the previous proposition. As for the second inequality,
the condition that k3
R(r(w)) ≤ 0 guarantees that the rich countries gain even if investment is diverted to the
middle or poor income countries. This is because the increase in interest income is the change in the interest
rate times the amount of investment diverted, whereas the loss in tax revenue as a result of the diversion
is only part of the change in marginal product times the investment diverted. And the change in marginal
product is bound by the change in the interest rate given the condition that no companies are constrained
under the MAI and hence will not be constrained without the MAI by Lemma 1.
Note the distributional implications behind this result. The capital owners (whether in rich or middle
income countries) always beneﬁt from the formation of a MAI. For claimants of companies’ after-tax proﬁts
there are two effects: companies that were constrained and now use others’ excess slackness beneﬁt, while
those that were unconstrained ex ante now face a higher cost of capital and reduce their investment. As
for tax revenue, there is the same ambiguity. In addition to those who own companies, other stakeholders
such as workers or complementary factors also might suffer from the contraction of domestic industries.
Note that this can happen even if the company itself beneﬁts, but does so only by investing more in other
countries. This implies that workers in rich countries are more likely to lose than company owners.
Proposition 6 allows us to focus on the interaction between middle-income countries and poor countries
in their group participation decisions. The crucial difference to the analysis above is that the rich countries
must always be part of any MAI, and hence decide whether there will be a MAI, while middle income and
poor countries only decide whether to join the club. Consider the decision on the part of the middle-income
countries. Depending on its anticipation of the choice by the poor countries, the middle-income countries
jointly decide to participate if
WM(RMP,r(RMP))>WM(RP,r(RP)), or WM(RM,r(RM)) >WM(R,r(R)).
In each of the two scenarios, the middle-income countries face the following trade-off. By joining the
MAI, these countries expand the demand for investments as they offer better commitment to property rights
18protection. However, as the scale of investments increases in this group of countries, the global cost of
capital increases as well, making both the existing investments and newly increased investments more costly.
Whether these countries will beneﬁt from the participation in the MAI depends on two factors: the extent to
which they import capital to ﬁnance their investments before entering the MAI, and the marginal increase in
the cost of capital. Evidently, if before entering the MAI a middle-income country exports capital or imports
capital at the margin (i.e. for an inﬁnitesimal amount of investment), it will always be better off by joining
the MAI as the increase in capital cost is dominated by a higher income of their domestic capital owners.
On the other hand, if a middle-income country already imports a substantial part of the capital invested there
before entering the MAI, whether it can beneﬁt from joining the MAI depends on how much the capital cost
increases and hence on the elasticity of the global capital supply.
To simplify matters, we assume that the global capital supply is of constant price elasticity, e. Deﬁne
KM(w) as the measure of capital utilized by a representative middle-income country under w conﬁguration,
and KM
im(w) ∈ (−¥,KM(w)] as the the measure of imported capital by the country under the corresponding
MAI.11
Proposition 7. Fix KM(w) where w ∈ {R,RP} and assume that the global supply of capital is of constant
elasticity e. There exists a threshold for the import of capital, in the form of K(e,w) with ¶K/¶e ≥ 0, such
that middle-income countries are better off collectively joining the existing MAI with group conﬁguration w
than not joining provided that KM
im(w) ≤ K(e,w).
Proof. We want to show that the losses are smaller than the gains. The losses stem entirely from the in-
creased capital expenses. A high enough elasticity will always reduce the change in the interest rate sufﬁ-
ciently to keep the loss smaller than the gain. Likewise, for a given elasticity, a small enough capital import
can always keep the loss smaller than the gain.
Turning now to the joint decision of the poor countries, the same analysis applies qualitatively, except for
the fact that the poor countries import all the capital for the investments from outside the group. Accordingly,
the increase in cost of capital due to their participation in the MAI will not be transferred to higher capital
income within these countries. Therefore, these countries can beneﬁt from jointly entering the MAI if and
only if the global capital supply is sufﬁciently elastic.
11The country exports capital under the MAI of conﬁguration w when KM
im(w) < 0.
19Proposition 8. Assume that the global supply of capital is of constant elasticity e. There exists eP(w) such
that poor countries are better off collectively joining the existing MAIwith group conﬁguration w ∈{R,RM}
only if e ≥ ep(w).
We are now in a position to determine what conﬁguration of MAI will emerge in equilibrium.
Proposition 9. Suppose that eM(w = R) < eP(w = R) and eM(w = RP) < eP(w = RM). Then the equilib-
rium MAI under joint decision making has the following “pecking order”.
i) w = R if KM
im(R) > K(e,R)
ii) w = RM if KM
im(R) ≤ K(e,R) and e < eP(RM)
iii) w = RMP if e > eP(RM) and KM
im(RP) ≤ K(e,RP).
The proof of this proposition follows directly from the previous propositions.
Importantly, even when a group of countries collectively decides to join an existing MAI, it does not
imply that this group (with the exception of rich countries) would necessarily welcome the existence of the
MAI in the ﬁrst place. Formally, this is the case for the poor country group if
WP(RM,r(RM)) <WP(RMP,r(RMP)) <WP(/ 0,r(/ 0)).
The ﬁrst inequality implies that the poor countries ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to join, given that the other two groups
form a MAI. The second inequality in turn says that the poor country group would ﬁnd it even better not
to have any such agreement at all.12 The reason why these two inequalities may hold simultaneously is
that r(RM)−r(/ 0) >> r(RMP)−r(RM). In other words, the formation of a MAI between rich and middle
countries does much more to raise the cost of capital, than the accession of the poor countries to such a
MAI. This is because, due to the assumption that k3
M(r) < k3
P(r), the middle income countries tend to take
the most advantage of such a MAI and hence increase investment and thus the capital cost the most.
The same issue could potentially arise for the middle income country group if
WM(R,r(R)) <WM(RM,r(RM)) <WM(/ 0,r(/ 0)).
12Note that we could discuss similar inequalities with respect to a MAI formed only by the rich and the poor countries, but as
shown previously this case does not arise in equilibrium.
20This scenario is less likely to arise, however, because on the one hand, capital owners in middle income
countries beneﬁt from the increase in capital cost, while on the other hand, it is the middle income countries
themselves whose accession to the MAI raises the cost of capital the most, while the formation of a MAI
by the rich countries alone does not raise the capital cost substantially, or not at all if kR(j) ≥ k3
R(r(R)) (in
which case, r(R)−r(/ 0) = 0 < r(RM)−r(R)).
Combining both lines of argument, poor countries would oppose the formation of any MAI, while the
middle income countries along with the rich countries will embrace the formation of a MAI when most of
the companies investing in poor (rich) countries are constrained (unconstrained), while in middle income
countries there is a balance between the two groups of companies, so that sufﬁcient IC-slackness can be used
to increase investment in the middle income country group and hence substantially increases the interest rate.
We summarize this argument in the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Suppose of the conditions in Propositions 8 and 7 are satisﬁed. If both K(r(R))−K(r(/ 0))
and K(r(RMP))−K(r(RM)) are sufﬁciently small, and K(r(RM))−K(r(R)) is sufﬁciently large, then both
rich and middle-income countries welcome, whereas poor countries oppose the formation of a MAI.
7 Conclusion
Despite the ubiquitousness of foreign direct investment — in the real world as well as in economics research
— the question of policy towards FDI has so far received surprisingly little attention. In this paper, we
start to ﬁll the void by analyzing the fascinating topic of a multilateral investment agreement. Such an
agreement ﬁgured prominently on the agendas of international organizations only a few years ago, but then
was stalled by the opposition from NGOs and the least developed countries along with the lack of evidence
for the effectiveness of bilateral agreements. The theory we present in this paper is able to explain these
obstacles and at the same time makes a strong case for a multilateral investment agreement. It views such an
agreement as a coordination device that allows multinational enterprises to coordinate their reaction if one
of them is expropriated by a host country.
The effects of an agreement, viewed from the perspective we adopt, differ depending on the type of
country. To illustrate our results, we distinguish rich developed countries, middle income countries in the
process of development, and poor least developed countries. We show that the industrialized countries gain
from the agreement. They are never tempted to expropriate and thus do not lose from increased coordination
on part of the companies. The only negative effect for them is the reduction in investment brought about
21by higher world interest rates, that leads to capital outﬂows or outsourcing from these countries. However,
this effect is dominated by the positive effect of an increase in repatriated proﬁts, since large multinationals
are predominantly based in industrialized countries. Despite the aggregate gain, there will be distributional
effects, as outsourcing and repatriated proﬁts affect different groups in these countries.
It is the middle income countries that have already attracted some FDIthat really gain from an agreement
directly by attracting more inward FDI. This is because the coordination of multinationals reduces the risk of
expropriation and thus enables more companies to invest in these countries. Even though, the investment per
ﬁrm decreases somewhat due to higher interest rates, the total effect is clearly welfare enhancing. For least
developed countries, that have in the past attracted FDI in at most a few resource intensive or agricultural
sectors, the picture looks bleak. There is not much incentive slackness that can be extended to new entrants
and therefore there will be hardly any new FDI and the only effect is the reduction in investment due to the
increased interest rates.
Our approach explains that attempts to establish a multilateral investment agreement were stalled by
opposition from less favored groups in industrialized countries along with objections from least developed
countries that were never obliged to join in but that even staying out would not have shielded from the
adverse effects of higher interest rates. As for the missing evidence for the effectiveness of bilateral treaties,
it is clear that the coordination effect we emphasize in this paper is most effective when the majority of
countries takes part in the agreement whereas a treaty between two countries, especially if small, would
have little effect.
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